



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

spectively, regard as expansions or implications of their respective principles, must either be rejected or re-interpreted. When Bradley, for example, adds that Thought can not receive differences from the outside, and ready-made, he evidently places himself at the viewpoint of Zeno. In so far as he intends to assert that immanence is a *sine qua non* of every form of logical apprehension, our argument has sought to establish the same position; but in so far as he identifies Thought in general with logical apprehension, he ignores the function of Belief as a supplementary mode of thought. For Belief is the form in which we apprehend the transcendent. On the other hand, when Royce seeks to interpret the endlessness of the reflective process as typical of the way in which a monistic principle logically unfolds itself in an infinite multiplicity of forms (thus substituting logical emanation or development for the idea of creation as an explanation of the world of space and time), it will be necessary to urge that the endlessness of the reflective process is always a repetition of the same; that it never passes over into a new quality; that its apparent "movement" is precisely analogous to the uniform velocity with which a moving body continues to move when free from the influence of every external force; that this endlessness, like the uniform motion of the moving body, is inherently static (not involving any change) and purely ideal, and thus affords by itself no description or type of any actual happening in any actual world; and, finally, we must urge that the arguments of Zeno, who was also a monist, constitute the historically valid objection against every attempt to establish a logical bridge between the One and the Many. On the basis of this understanding I propose, as a summary of the argument contained in the preceding pages, the following unification of the two principles quoted above: *The endless quantitative approximation toward a new quality which is implicit in the process of reflection remains always within the quality initially posited, thus testifying to the impossibility of a necessary logical transition from one quality to another.*<sup>8</sup>

DAVID F. SWENSON.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

---

#### REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*The Idealistic Reaction against Science.* A. ALIOTTA. Translated by Agnes McCaskill. London: Macmillan and Company. 1914. Pp. xxii + 483.

This work is a revision of the author's "La Reazione idealistica contro la scienza," 1912, made for presentation in English dress. Besides the

<sup>8</sup> I owe the underlying idea of this paper to a study of Kierkegaard, whose logical position I have sketched in a paper published in a recent number of the *Philosophical Review*.

labor of correction and improvement Professor Aliotta has undertaken a certain rearrangement of his material. The constructive portions, formerly scattered through the book, he has now collected into a concluding chapter which gives the outlines of his spiritualistic realism. The earlier—by far the more extended—parts are devoted to an historico-critical discussion of his immediate theme. The translation runs easily and fluently, in spite of the inordinate length of the paragraphs—the longest, one might conjecture, since the “*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.” And in so far as can be gathered without the original at hand, the rendering is accurate. Here and there the reader queries whether certain small ambiguities existed in the original text. But in a much greater proportion of instances it is evident from comparison with the sources of the doctrines described that the work of translation has been successfully accomplished.

These few ambiguities may also proceed from another cause. Part I., “The Reaction from Intellectualism in the New Theories of Knowledge,” ranges from Spencer to Royce and Münsterberg, considering neo-criticism, empirico-criticism, neo-Hegelianism, Bergson and his school, and pragmatism on the way. Part II., “The New Theories of Mathematics and Physics,” covers the non-Euclidean geometry, logic and mathematics, energetics, and the like. The method of presenting these wide-ranging theories is the historico-critical. The doctrines considered are stated by interpretative narration. The critical remarks are appended in separate sections, or suggested in connection with the principal theses. Now and then the reader must be careful to note just where history stops and criticism begins, or even to distinguish the primary doctrine from its narrative reproduction. But these blemishes are few and of minor importance. In the main, the author puts the reader in his debt by his extended and accurate review of recent thinking in so far as this bears upon his central theme. There are few books which can be so heartily recommended as summaries of recent epistemology, alike in its philosophical and in its scientific forms. The trained student will here find reminders of much of his own reading, and in addition suggestive reports of work that perhaps has escaped his direct study.

The title of Professor Aliotta's treatise, however, hardly describes its content. It would be more precise to term it *The Reaction against Intellectualism, and its Culmination in Recent Scientific Methodology*. Intellectualism the author takes in the widest sense of the word as “those epistemological systems which assign an autonomous value to the cognitive function”; and he counts as “forms of reaction all those which . . . make the value of science and knowledge in general depend upon . . . other functions of the mind and rank will and imagination above intellect” (p. xxii). Hence he is led to discuss both the conflict between intellectualism and voluntarism or emotionalism and the conflict between rationalism and empiricism, intuitionism, etc. So the currents of his thinking cross and re-cross. But there can be no doubt of the point at which his most successful work is achieved. Far better than the majority of recent writers Professor Aliotta recognizes and emphasizes the accurate analysis of the elements of cognition and of their reciprocal relation. He

will have naught of pan-logism or of abstract dialectic, although it might be said that his inclinations are rather toward the rationalistic than the empirical tradition. He will have naught of empirico-criticism or of pure empiricism or intuitionism, when these are taken in their absolute forms. Thought and intuition, perception and conception he finds alike integral to the cognitive process, so that one-sided systems which emphasize either phase to the neglect of its fellow inevitably lead to reactions of the most extreme type. This is the teaching of history since the time of Socrates, Plato, and the Sophists. And critical analysis shows the historical rhythm grounded in the nature of the case.

Armed with such principles, Professor Aliotta is in a position of advantage when he examines recent epistemological theories. Empirico- or agnostic evolutionism, neo-Idealism, pragmatism, intuitionism betray their several elements of weakness if they are tried by these critical tests. In particular, he is able to expose the fallacies of the ultra-phenomenalistic views of science. Here too a reaction against intellectualism has gone on. From dogmatic naturalism later methodologists have turned toward the economic and symbolic interpretation of scientific laws, toward science as concrete sensorial prevision, toward "science without hypotheses," toward phenomenalistc energetics, and the like. But this is clearly reaction. And in all these theories, when they are taken literally, it is easy to show the fault. Science never is divorced from thought, for it never can be; perception, even of the simplest kind, includes intellectual factors. The phenomenalistc methodology but repeats the errors of classical empiricism: the elements of intellection necessary to scientific knowledge are tacitly assumed; or the results of intellection are mistaken for pure percepts and substituted in their room; or, if the genesis of thought is considered, its forms are elicited from the data because they have first been introduced among them, etc. In the main the argument here is just and salutary. And it is certainly pertinent to the discussions of the day.

The final chapter broadens noëtics into metaphysics. As all knowing involves intellection, so it presupposes rational relations to a rational environment. But knowledge is a function of personal subjects alone. Nature, then, is rational and real; but mind is its end and goal. So realism of the spiritual, or as it was formerly termed, of the ideal type is the metaphysical view to which epistemology leads. Further, epistemology implies an Absolute Consciousness to which mind and nature and the relation of the two are present, for "faith in the value of science is faith in God" (pp. 460-5). This consciousness is an Absolute Self-Conscious Personality, eternally active and creative, who may be validly conceived after the analogy of man's nature, since anthropomorphism of a reasonable kind is present in all our thought. These conclusions, as we have said, are stated in the final chapter of the treatise. Much about them is attractive. But they are sketched rather than elaborated in the present work. The burden and the success of this is in epistemology proper. In

this field it is a substantial addition alike to the later historical discussions of the subject and to the more recent critical arguments.

A. C. ARMSTRONG.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY,  
MIDDLETOWN, CONN.

*What Should I Believe? An Inquiry into the Nature, Grounds and Value of the Faiths of Science, Society, Morals and Religion.*  
GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. Longmans, Green, and Company. 1915.  
Pp. xiii + 275.

This book, the third in a series of four, following naturally after "What Can I Know?" and "What Ought I to Do?" is an attempt to show the reasonableness of moral and religious belief and the duty of believing. The main difference between knowledge and belief is that in the former there is always some awareness of the grounds on which our assent rests, whereas in belief proper we give our assent without being conscious of the grounds. This, however, does not mean that belief is necessarily unreasonable. "Instinctive belief is not opposed to rational conviction." On the contrary, the task of the intellect "is to discover and expand the *justification* of belief, and thus convert otherwise blind belief into rational conviction" (pp. 13 ff.).

From this it will be seen that Professor Ladd is opposed to "the present tendency to . . . discredit the authority of reason in respect to the greater faiths. . . . The office of reflective thinking . . . must always . . . be that of revealing the truth or the falsity" of our beliefs. Since, however, the highest of our beliefs "are not the offspring of sense, . . . our primary aim can not reasonably be to prove them as the demonstrative or strictly inductive sciences need proof, but to 'purify and support' them" (pp. 28 ff.).

The chapter on "The So-Called 'Will to Believe'" brings out the fact that in the title of the book, *Should* is meant to imply moral obligation. It is my duty to believe what is reasonable. "The choice of the worthier, because more reasonable, among our beliefs" is a "moral kind of activity" (p. 51). In this limited sense, Professor Ladd gives his adherence to the doctrine of "the will to believe." I am not sure, however, that his position is unassailable. That, at least in many instances, it is our duty to consider the question of the reasonableness of our beliefs will doubtless be admitted. But when, as a result of our examination, we are prepared to pronounce one belief more reasonable than another, is it then within our choice to accept the one or the other? If I am convinced that *A* is more reasonable than *B*, I already accept *A*. If I do not feel quite convinced, but still *incline to think A* the more reasonable, again there seems to be no occasion for an act of will. What we have now is a case of probable judgment, of "trowling," as Professor Ladd elsewhere calls it. In short, I think that the influence of will upon belief is more indirect and more subtle than Professor Ladd represents it as being.

Another case that the author seems to regard as furnishing an opportunity for "the will to believe" is of even more doubtful character. In